Kentucky Court of Appeals - Unpublished
Insurance -Homeowners - Intentional Act Exclusion
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company v. Conley, 2015 WL 4040058 (Ky.App. July 2, 2015)

This case presents no remarkable legal theory but is instead remarkable for the tone with which the Court of Appeals addresses what passes for justice in some counties in Kentucky. Conley was convicted of murdering his girlfriend, and a wrongful death action was brought against him. Kentucky Farm Bureau defended under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment action. Pretty obvious that there is no coverage, correct? The trial judge held that the definition of intentional act contained in the penal code did not control, and instead relied on language from an endorsement that was not part of the policy. The policy booklet contained endorsements that related to personal injury liability, but Conley had not purchased that coverage. The language relied on specifically applied to personal injury liability, but the trial judge applied it to bodily injury liability coverages. The Court of Appeals wrote:

The words, “as contained in the Endorsement not applied to the subject policy,” as italicized above, bear repeating. In its review, the circuit court took notice of—and found dispositive to its review—an endorsement which it acknowledged was never a part of Keith E. Conley’s policy. Specifically, the circuit court determined that the endorsement contained an alternative definition of the word “intent”; and, based upon that alternative definition of intent (which the circuit court apparently believed conflicted with the ordinary meaning of the word “intent”) the circuit court determined that the policy’s use of the word “intent” was ambiguous. As such, it mandated coverage under the circumstances.

In sum, the circuit court manufactured an ambiguity by looking beyond the four corners of the contract. This was impermissible. The rules of contract interpretation dictate that the parties’ intentions are to be discerned only from the four corners of the contract itself. Absent ambiguity, extrinsic evidence should not be considered, and a court is required to interpret the contract terms by assigning language its ordinary meaning. [Citation omitted]. Stated differently, because the policy that Keith E. Conley purchased from Farm Bureau did not define the word “intent,” the task before circuit court was to (1) define “intent” by its ordinary and plain meaning; and, (2) determine, using that definition, whether the intentional acts exclusion prohibited coverage for Conley’s shooting and killing of Jessica Newsome.

Of course the Court had no difficulty in concluding that murder was an intentional act, and so held. The panel further reaffirmed that the insured could not relitigate whether he was guilty of murder.